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Migration Control and Narratives of Steering 
Christina Boswell 
 
Abstract 
 
The dynamics of migration are incredibly complex, creating immense problems for 
governments attempting to steer immigration. These types of problems are well 
elucidated in German sociological literature on societal steering, and especially 
Luhmann’s analysis of the impediments to steering by the political and legal systems. 
Politics and the law develop highly simplifying models of the dynamics they are 
seeking to steer, resulting in various problems of distortion and counterproductive 
effects. We can see examples of such effects in the case of migration control, where 
attempts to prevent irregular labour or stay have led to numerous unintended effects. 
However, it is far from evident how such problems of steering can be addressed. A 
number of cognitive, social and political factors place pressure on policy-makers to 
adopt highly simplifying models of these processes. In particular, party politics and 
the mass media call for simple and dramatised narratives of migration control; and 
bureaucratic organisations require the development of narratives that are easily 
communicated and justifiable to officials, practitioners and interest groups. The 
implication is that policy interventions have a structural tendency to ‘short circuit’ the 
complexity of the migratory processes they are attempting to steer.  
 
 
 
Migration policy makers tend to develop relatively simple and intuitively plausible 
narratives about the impacts of their policies. Officials need to be able to understand 
and communicate the logic behind their interventions, and to justify this logic to 
critics, target groups, or those involved in implementation. This justificatory 
requirement is even greater in the case of politicians, who need to persuade the public 
about the appropriateness and effectiveness of policy, usually via the mass media. The 
pressure to produce simple and compelling narratives is cerainly characteristic of 
policies on migration control, understood as measures adopted to exlcude irregular 
migrations or other unwanted foreign nationals through entry restrictions, border 
control, detention and deportation. Given the complexity of migration dynamics, 
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however, the need to develop straightforward stories of cause and effect is bound to 
result in a high degree of simplification. Indeed, for reasons I shall discuss later, there 
is likely to be a significant disconnect between policy narratives and the phenomena 
they seek to depict. This can result in unrealistic expectations about the state’s 
capacity to steer migratory dynamics, with often clumsy policy interventions failing to 
capture the complexity of the objects they are seeking to influence.
1
  
 
This paper will explore the nature and sources of this gap between policy narratives 
and state capacity to control migration, drawing on literature on societal steering. By 
steering, I mean attempts by the state or legal system to direct the behaviour of 
members of a society or the social systems to which they belong. Much of the 
literature on societal steering is profoundly pessimistic about the possibilities for such 
forms of guidance. The systems theory of Niklas Luhmann in particular points to the 
inherent incapacity of politics and the law to steer other social systems, and warns of 
the potential problems of distortion or counter-productivity that may result from such 
attempts.  
 
The paper will proceed in two steps. First, I shall introduce the literature on steering, 
and apply it to the case of migration control. I consider how far the steering problems 
set out in sociological literature have been encountered in the context of attempts to 
steer social systems through employer sanctions and through barring illegal 
immigrants’ access to health care. In both cases, one can observe clear examples of 
the sorts of problems flagged by systems theory.  
 
One typical response to problems of societal steering (including in the area of 
migration policy) is to call for better social knowledge about the targets of state 
intervention. In part two of the paper, I consider how far research can help overcome 
problems of societal steering. While orthodox systems theorists are sceptical about the 
possibility of solving steering problems through more knowledge, there appears to be 
some scope for improving interventions through drawing on certain sorts of 
operational experience or social scientific research. 
 
                                                 
1 Arguably, this is one of the reasons for the apparently ‘failure’ of migration policy – see, for example, 
Castles 2004. 
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However, as I argue in the second part of the paper, in practice a range of political and 
organizational factors militate against developing more ‘accurate’ models of the 
societal dynamics being steered. Political and media pressure encourages 
governments to develop more accessible and compelling accounts of the nature and 
goals of policy interventions. Meanwhile, pressures within administrative agencies 
may militate towards narratives that gloss over complexity or conflicts and keep 
members’ expectations manageable. As a result, rather than being oriented towards 
better understanding of societal processes, the state’s narratives of societal steering 
are more likely to be oriented to respond to either the requirements of political 
legitimation, or internal organizational needs.  
 
Moreover, in many cases, these two sets of requirements may conflict, producing two 
rather different narratives: a populist one developed by the media and party political 
debate, and a more technocratic narrative emanating from expert knowledge and 
espoused by the bureaucracy. Populist narratives in particular are likely to simplify 
and ‘short circuit’ the complexity of social systems. Insofar as policy makers are 
obliged to adopt such narratives, policy may fail to rectify, or even exacerbe, the 
problems it is seeking to address. 
 
 
1. Crisis of Societal Steering? 
 
Theories of Societal Steering 
 
An extensive body of literature since the 1970s has warned of acute problems with 
attempts by the state and legal system to steer areas of the economy and society 
(Habermas 1976; Mayntz 1987; Offe 1972; Luhmann 1997; Willke 1984; Teubner 
1986). While contributions are diverse, there are some common threads running 
through the literature, at least in terms of salient features of the problem (if not its 
origins or proposed remedies). First, scholars have observed a huge expansion in the 
state’s involvement in regulating different areas of social life. The state is now 
expected to intervene to regulate not just the economy and welfare provisions, but 
also multiple and ever-expanding areas of social life, public health and the 
environment. States are attributed a huge degree of responsibility for addressing 
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problems in different spheres affecting societal welfare – not just in terms of ensuring 
adequate material conditions or economic stability, but in regulating all sorts of 
aspects of social problems, and shielding their populations from what are constructed 
to be ever-multiplying risks (Beck 1996; Giddens 1994; Luhmann 1991).  
 
Second, it is acknowledged that these social systems have become increasingly 
complex, rendering traditional control instruments ineffective (Moran 2002). The 
state continues to rely on “command strategies” of law (Stewart 1988), or traditional 
forms of regulations backed up by hierarchical enforcement of sanctions (Scott 2002).  
These instruments are systematically failing to motivate compliance or achieve the 
desired outcomes. Nonetheless, there is a continued expectation that the state is the 
appropriate source of steering: the state is still considered to be the only legitimate 
locus of decisions on questions affecting more than one system, or for aspects of 
systems which have broad societal implications (Willke 1985: 289). 
 
One account, especially prevalent in political science literature, defines the problem 
as one of motivating compliance where regulations run “against the grain”. 
Hierarchical control systems characterised by legal rules and sanctions applied by an 
agency or court are seen as inappropriate for motivating compliance in non-traditional 
areas of state control (Scott 2002: 63). This has triggered calls for new forms of 
“smart” regulation.  This can take the form of regulation through economic incentives 
or competition (Hood et al. 1999); community-based peer pressure, and the social  
stigmatisation of non-compliance (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992: 25); or designing 
policies in such a way that non-compliance is prevented. Responsibility for designing 
and enforcing regulations may meanwhile be outsourced to the market (through the 
price mechanism, or competition), or to interest groups and other societal groups (so-
called “moral suasion”) (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992). 
 
This account is fine as far as it goes. But it is largely silent on the reasons for, and 
dynamics of, the forces which lead to expanded state involvement in new spheres. 
This limits its usefulness in addressing problems of rising expectations about state 
steering. Moreover, it more or less implicitly reduces steering problems to conflicts of 
interest, which belies the complexity of problems of intervention and steering. It 
therefore makes sense to turn to sociological contributions on steering problems. A 
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number of mainly German sociologists have located the problem in a more 
fundamental incapacity of politics and the law to steer social systems. This is the 
supposition of both Habermas (as initially set out in Legitimation Crisis and then 
modified and elaborated in Theory of Communicative Action – Habermas 1976 and 
1985), as well as Luhmannian systems theory (Luhmann 1981, 1986). On Habermas’ 
account, the state becomes involved in steering an expanded range of social spheres in 
order to compensate for its failure to prevent economic crises. However, such 
interventions represent an interference with the dynamics of socio-cultural 
reproduction. The state ends up by imposing criteria of rationality and patterns of 
organization which undermine norms and practices of the “life world”. This is what 
Habermas refers to as “colonialization” of the life world (Habermas 1981: 542). 
Colonialization deprives areas of social life of the internal socio-cultural resources 
that previously served the function of socialising their members. Steering thus 
precipitates the breakdown of traditional and taken-for-granted resources within 
society, and is in this sense both normatively undesirable and self-defeating on its 
own terms. 
 
Systems theorists also see problems with such interventions, but their account 
diverges in (at least) two important respects. First, they contend that the trend of 
increasing intervention in social spheres is not a result of crisis in the capitalist 
system, but rather the inclusivist logic of the welfare state, which establishes a cycle 
of ever-increasing societal expectations and political guarantees about social 
protection (Luhmann 1981). Second, rather than conceptualizing the object of 
intervention as the ‘life world’, they argue that the problem of steering arises with the 
attempt to steer functionally differentiated systems. On this account, society is divided 
into increasingly complex, autonomous and functionally differentiated spheres, such 
as the economy, legal system, welfare system, education, health, and so on. In order to 
deal with complexity, each social system develops its own codes for making sense of 
itself and its environment. These codes are based on communicative selections 
specific to the system, so that each system becomes self-referential, operating 
according to its own logic, or system of communication (Luhmann 1997).  
 
Systems are not closed, however, but are more or less preoccupied in reading signals 
from their environments, including signals from the political system or the legal 
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system concerning regulation. Where there is continued interaction between two 
systems – for example attempts by the political system to steer education, or the legal 
system to regulate the labour market – each system will develop a set of 
presuppositions that enables it to model the other system (Born and Goldschmidt 
1997: 27-8). In the terminology adopted in this speical issue (see Introduction), they 
construct simplifying narratives about the operation of the other system. The regulator 
observes and models the system that is the object of regulation, developing a series of 
expectations about the causal linkages between its intervention and the behaviour of 
the system. Thus, for example, the legal system develops models of the social world 
(Teubner 1982: 297), a set of theories about criminal behaviour and the impact of 
sanctions. In this sense, the legal system remains “cognitively open” (Luhmann 1986: 
113): it processes information from its environment about societal behaviour, and is 
able to adapt itself accordingly. The system that is the object of regulation in turn 
develops a set of beliefs about its environment, and the meaning and implications of 
the attempt at regulation. Insofar as both systems model one another, one can speak of 
a “structural coupling” between systems.  
 
However, this does not imply a close fit between the intentions of regulation and 
outcomes, for at least three reasons. First, structural coupling by no means guarantees 
“correct” interpretation of the regulatory signals within the recipient system. This 
problem of communication emanates from both regulating and regulated system. The 
systems of politics and especially law are both likely to operate according to a set of 
highly simplifying assumptions about the operation of cause and effect within the 
targeted system. They will tend to assume a form of linear causality, which belies the 
complexity of operations within the system (Teubner 1982: 298). Where the system is 
highly complex, the set of linkages influencing behaviour can be opaque and 
counterintuitive (Willke 1985: 282). As Luhmann writes, “residual improbability and 
hence overstrain comes about by using conditional programmes for the attainment of 
ends which are not within the reach of immediate causal operations” (Luhmann 1986: 
123). The translation of regulations is equally problematic from the point of view of 
the regulated system, which can only interpret the regulation in the communicative 
codes available within its system. It can only patchily grasp the purposive logic of the 
regulation from the point of view of the other system, and even more patchily 
transpose the requirements into the language of its own operations.  
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Second, even where the recipient system’s reading of the signal approximates fairly 
closely to the intent, this does not imply a will to comply with the system’s 
interpretation of the regulation.  Where a regulation runs counter to the system’s 
established mode of operating, it is likely to adopt a strategy of non-compliance as far 
as possible. The regulation thus turns out to be largely irrelevant for the system, 
failing to effect a change in behaviour (Teubner 1986: 311). The regulation may then 
be performing a merely symbolic function, reassuring politics or public opinion that 
something is being done (Brunsson 2002; Edelman 1999).  
 
Third, insofar as the regulation does secure its intended effects, this will frequently 
produce new, unforeseen impacts. Where a system does feel compelled to respect the 
letter of the regulation, this may lead to a number of distorting effects that can be 
damaging to the system being regulated. We can define these unexpected outcomes as 
either distorting effects, i.e. negative repercussions (or what economists term 
externalities) in other parts of the system; or counterproductive effects, i.e. distortions 
which undermine the very purpose of the intervention (see also Mayntz 1987). 
Distorting effects may trigger additional regulation in new areas of the system (e.g. 
raising corporate taxes may lead to an increase in bankruptcy, prompting new 
legislation to support struggling firms). However, if such negative effects are not 
picked up by politics or the media, they may leave the responsible political or legal 
system unscathed, and the intervention may be treated as a success. Thus the original 
narrative is interpreted as accurate, and continues to inform policy. Counterproductive 
effects are more difficult to disguise, as they defeat the very purpose of the 
intervention (for example, imposing rules about healthy school dinners, which leads 
to more children opting out of the provision and eating fast-food lunches instead). 
Such effects may generate a redoubling of existing efforts, based on the same 
simplifying narrative, which similarly fail to achieve the intended effect, since they 
too “short-circuit” the complexity of the system -  though they may at least 
temporarily detract from the problem, by demonstrating the political or legal system is 
taking action (Murphy 2006: 56).  
 
Forrester puts the problem well, when he writes that “social systems are inherently 
insensitive to most policy changes that people select in an effort to alter the behaviour 
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of a system… all of them seem to have a few sensitive influence points through which 
the behaviour of the system can be changed. These influence points are not in the 
locations where most people expect” (Forrester 1968: 205). 
 
The Case of Migration Control 
 
How does this relate to societal steering in the area of migration control?  
Interventions aimed at controlling migration can be aimed either at steering the 
behaviour of individuals migrants, or at preventing or limiting their incorporation into 
social systems. The first type of intervention would include conditional legal 
programmes that sanction an immigrant’s infringement of rules: detention or 
deportation for irregular entry, stay or employment. In systems theoretic language, 
this would imply the steering of individual psychic systems, through the threat of 
sanctions for particular types of behaviour. As in all such attempts, there are major 
limits to attempts of the political or legal systems to direct behaviour. As Luhmann 
puts it, people “cannot be steered causally and technically by means of law and 
money”, or at least not in a direct sense.  
 
This is all the more problematic with attempts to steer behaviour on choices which 
affect livelihoods in such a profound sense. The issue of which country one will live 
in (entry and stay), and the possibility of making a living there (employment), are 
unlikely to be influenced in a reliable way by using the type of sanctions typically 
applied to other areas of individual behaviour. One need only think of the extreme 
risks people are willing to take in entering wealthy receiving countries, or the degree 
of force that enforcement agencies frequently apply to implement deportations. 
Steering behaviour on such crucial matters seems to require an inordinate level of 
resources, and forms of coercion that are highly contestable from a civil rights 
perspective (see Carling and Hernández-Carretero in this issue). The problems of 
distortion and counterproductivity generated by such attempts are well known: a rise 
in dangerous and exploitative practices of migrant smuggling and trafficking to evade 
controls; or the development of informal networks to support irregular immigrants. 
State attempts to redouble control efforts are equally familiar: expanded use of 
detention, dawn raids, reinforced border controls, all requiring huge resources, raising 
problems of civil liberties, and producing their own new distortions. 
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The alternative, more typical, option is to target the social systems on which migrants 
are dependent for crucial aspects of welfare, or which help them to implement their 
travel and stay plans. Thus regulations have typically targeted the labour market 
(employer sanctions), and the welfare and various social systems (education, health, 
housing), or the systems transporting them (carrier sanctions). In some cases the 
attempt simply involves denial of an entitlement (to education, full health treatment, 
welfare), in others it involves imposing a penalty on the system for including or 
granting access (employers, airlines and truck companies, in Germany even schools 
and doctors). These systems generally operate according to far more inclusive 
principles vis-à-vis immigrants than the political system (Bommes and Geddes 2001; 
Bommes 2007). Their criteria of inclusion and exclusion are not based on the legal 
status of individuals, but rather on their relevance for the system – be this their 
employability (labour market), willingness to pay for services (transport, 
accommodation), need of treatment (health), education or social support (social 
Services). This discrepancy triggers the sorts of problems of societal steering outlined 
above. Let us briefly consider the problem in relation to two spheres: access to the 
labour market, and to health care.  
 
Taking the labour market first, attempts to control irregular employment have 
typically taken the form of employer sanctions. Policy follows the typical model of 
intervention as described by Teubner: “the goal determines the program, the program 
determines the norm, the norm determines changes of behaviour, those changes 
determine the desired effects” (Teubner 1986: 312). In terms of regulating employers, 
one can conceptualise this as follows. The political system adopts the goal of reducing 
irregular employment. Based on its understanding of the economy, it assumes that 
employers’ behaviour in employing undocumented migrants will be influenced by 
increasing the costs of so doing (whether in terms of financial or prison penalties). It 
instructs the legal system to codify and enforce a set of penalties for employers who 
infringe rules on employment. The expected result is a decrease in irregular 
employment, and thus irregular immigration.  
 
But the form of intervention already creates problems for the legal system. First, it 
raises the question of how to deal with the problem of inadvertent employment of 
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migrants without a permit. Regulations and courts have had a difficult time 
determining how far employers should be liable for failing to detect forged 
documents, especially given the sophistication of many forging techniques and the 
wide availability of counterfeited documents. Second is the issue of the resources 
required to ensure effective implementation. In order to provide an effective deterrent, 
enforcement agencies need to ensure there is a high enough chance of being detected 
and successfully prosecuted, and that penalties are sufficiently sever. This will require 
substantial resources for spot checks, court hearings, and so on. 
 
For the firms involved, such regulations are even more problematic. Employer 
sanctions may well be perceived by the regulated system as a constraint on 
productivity and growth, especially where foreign workers are considered to be more 
attractive as employees, or where there is a shortage of domestic labour. One 
frequently hears of cases of explicit exploitation of illegal workers, but there are 
clearly numerous cases where such arrangements are entered into autonomously and 
seen as mutually beneficial (most of us know someone who has employed a 
handyman or cleaning person on an irregular basis – if we haven't done so ourselves). 
Both employers and labour may see the regulations as unreasonable, and, aware of 
relatively lax enforcement, will try to circumvent regulation. Similarly, there is 
evidence that in many cases courts are reluctant to prosecute business, lacking the 
capacity to ascertain responsibility, or showing themselves to be sympathetic towards 
the (usually small) firms that are affected. Where low enforcement rates become the 
object of political and media attention, the political system is likely to step up efforts 
to enforce sanctions. As in the UK case, this will typically involve more of the same: 
raising penalties, and increasing spot checks.  
 
Such attempts at steering have also been known to produce a number of distortions. 
Where such measures are implemented, uncertainty about the status of potential 
employees may motivate discriminatory practices. If in doubt about the validity of 
documents, an employer may prefer to employ someone more “obviously” 
British/German, etc. Another possibility is that smaller firms may go bankrupt, or that 
the intervention may lead to more substantial restructuring of the sector (not 
necessarily a negative externality). 
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These sorts of problems are not limited to interventions in the economic system. 
Parallel problems emerge where the political and legal systems have endeavoured to 
regulate inclusion of illegal immigrants into the health system. The public health 
system, like other social services in modern welfare states, operates according to an 
inclusive logic (Luhmann, 1981; Bommes, 2000). Its principle criterion of inclusion 
distinguishes between those who are sick and in need of treatment, who are relevant 
to the system; and those who are not in need of treatment, who are excluded from the 
system. Any attempts by the political system to impose other criteria of selection are 
experienced as an irritation, running against the grain of the function of the health 
system.  
 
The UK National Health System is a prime example of a highly inclusive system, in 
which residents have a right to free access to almost all primary and secondary health 
care facilities, and generally need only give an address in order to register with a 
General Practitioner (GP) or access hospital services. Since Summer 2006 there have 
been discussions about a possible ban on access for illegal migrants for all but 
emergency health care. GPs and primary care trusts have protested that plans are 
unworkable. These services do not typically request identification or proof of address, 
and appear reluctant to start doing so, not seeing it as part of their remit. Even if such 
checks are made at the point of registration to a practice, GPs have been sceptical 
about the practicalities of removing asylum applicants from the National Health 
Service register once their claims or appeals have been rejected. More generally, the 
idea of excluding people in need of care is anathema to health professionals.
2
  
 
As in the case of employer sanctions, one can also point to potential distortions 
produced by this type of regulation. The exclusion from early treatment is predicted to 
increase pressure on emergency services and require more expensive treatment further 
down the line. In this sense it is far from clear if it is either cost effective, or an aid to 
the planning of health care.  
 
Given these problems, it may well be the case that such a measure would remain 
largely symbolic, designed to allay public and media criticism about illegal 
                                                 
2 Interestingly, we are now seeing similar problems with the recent request by the Border 
Agency that universities check on the residence status of their foreign students. 
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immigrants placing a burden on the welfare state. In the event of introducing 
legislation to this effect, the state may tolerate persistent infringement of the 
regulation by the health system, at least until opposition parties or the media observe 
failed implementation and create renewed pressure to enforce the rules. 
 
In both of these cases – that of employer sanctions and barring access to health 
services – one can observe clear problems of system steering. They point to a 
fundamental limitation of state interventions to restrict the incorporation of illegal 
migrants. And they illustrate well the general points about system steering theorised 
by Luhmann et al. Arguably, the problem is made all the more acute by an added 
discrepancy: the basic tension between the inclusionary logic of social and economic 
systems, on the one hand, and the continued exclusionary logic of the political system 
(Bommes 2007). This inclusive tendency of social systems facilitates continued 
illegal immigration, which in turn increases pressure on the political system to ratchet 
up its interventions aimed at controlling the phenomena (Boswell 2008a). But there is 
every reason to believe that these social systems are quite adept at bypassing such 
attempts; and, where they fail to do so, that political and legal interventions simply 
create new problems and distortions in the targeted system. 
 
 
2. The Politics of Social Knowledge 
 
One typical response to the perceived inadequacies of steering is to call for more 
information and research on the targeted systems. On this account, the problem of 
steering is explained in terms of a failure of politics or the legal system to grasp the 
complex dynamics within different systems. The narratives of societal steering 
developed by administrative agencies or legal regulators are too simplistic. Indeed, 
this perception appears to be behind the impetus towards increasing funding of 
research and inhouse research capacity on migration issues (Boswell 2009).   
 
There have been various suggestions proffered by scholars of societal steering about 
what sort of knowledge would be appropriate for understanding the complexity of 
regulated systems. On one account, in order to cope with this complexity, social 
research should focus on detailed case studies of particular systems and regulatory 
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impacts within these (Mayntz 1987). This implies deviating from traditional 
nomological approaches to scientific enquiry, which attempt to derive generalizable 
claims about causal processes. Such abstract models fail to capture the complex 
configuration of operations in any particular system, implying the need for more 
qualitative, inductive research. We can see the application of something akin to this 
approach in the emphasis on “good practice” in various policy documents and 
knowledge transfer events. It implies taking (albeit often rather superficial) 
examinations of case studies as a basis for understanding the dynamics of societal 
steering, which may then be tentatively applied to an extended range of cases.  
 
Systems theory is more sceptical about the potential for knowledge to help overcome 
problems of societal steering. Luhmann himself argued that the problem of inter-
system communication was not reducible to the issue of complexity. No matter how 
in-depth the research, it is simply not possible to understand the internal dynamics of 
a system without using the communicative codes operating within that system. 
Neither would such an understanding solve the problem of steering social systems 
with the “wrong” media (i.e. law or money) (Luhmann 1997). Teubner, however, is 
less pessimistic. He suggests that while systems may only be able to observe one 
another as “black boxes”, there is nonetheless scope for modelling another system’s 
behaviour through more systematic observation of the system’s outputs, and how 
these are related to inputs. In other words, the focus should be on areas of interlinkage 
between systems (Teubner 1984). 
 
Whether or not one accepts this notion, there is a further set of barriers to knowledge 
production and utilization which should make us sceptical about the prospects for 
accumulating better knowledge. I would like to illustrate the problem by taking the 
case of knowledge utilization in the UK Home Office, and specifically the research 
commissioned or carried out by its research service, the  Immigration Research and 
Statistics service (IRS). Since it was established in 2001, IRS research has spanned 
three areas: the economic and social impacts of migration; asylum-seeking and the 
asylum system; and refugee integration. Very little research has been commissioned 
on illegal migration. Of 28 studies commissioned or internally produced and 
published over this period (2001-2007), only two studies directly dealt with irregular 
migration: one on “sizing the illegally resident population” (RDS 2003b) and a survey 
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of illegal residents in detention (RDS 2005). A third study provided a literature review 
on trafficking for labour exploitation (RDS 2007). Other than that, there have been 
some studies of indirect relevance, notably on the social networks and decision-
making of asylum seekers, and the impact of asylum (RDS 2002a, 2002b, 2003a). The 
only study approaching any sort of analysis of social systems was on “Employers’ use 
of labour migration” (RDS 2006).  
 
To be sure, the Home Office (or its relevant department, the Border Agency) does 
draw on other sources of knowledge about its target population. It is especially reliant 
on its own operational wing as a key source of information on the behavioural 
patterns of the immigrants and asylum seekers whom it seeks to control, as well as the 
impacts of its own policies. It is also continuously exposed to information from other 
departments and the voluntary sector. Nonetheless, on first sight it does seem quite 
astonishing how limited attempts are to analyse the dynamics of illegal migrants and 
their interaction with social systems.  
 
This may become less surprising if we consider the political and organizational 
context of migration control. Regarding the political context, I would like to offer two 
observations. First, in areas of policy which have become highly politicized and are 
the object of intensive media scrutiny, governments are likely to resort to rhetoric and 
symbolic decisions in order to meet public approval (Brunsson 2002, Edelman 1999). 
In most areas of regulation, policies take effect only in the medium to long term (i.e. 
beyond electoral terms), and their impact may be diffuse and difficult to measure. 
Governments under pressure to “deliver” will tend to prioritise higher profile, often 
symbolic measures. This would explain the apparent attraction of introducing 
measures such as employer sanctions or a ban on health access, in the absence of 
resources to enforce such regulations, or in the knowledge that these provisions are 
simply unenforceable.  
 
Where such symbolic approaches prevail, one would expect knowledge utilisation to 
follow a similar logic, i.e. perform a symbolic, legitimising function rather than being 
oriented towards adjusting outcomes. In other words, organizations may be keen to 
underpin the credibility of their policy choices through drawing on research findings, 
or attempt to legitimize their agency through demonstrating a sound knowledge base. 
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Knowledge utilisation becomes more a question of signalling the legitimacy of 
policies or policy-makers, rather than a resource to help inform the substance of 
polices. It is valued for its symbolic, rather than instrumental, function (Boswell 2008, 
2009). 
 
The second point is that the administration is usually well aware of problems of 
enforcement. In this respect, the accumulation of social knowledge may simply draw 
attention to the state’s deficiencies in controlling irregular migration. This point is 
nicely illustrated by the controversy over the lack of Home Office data on irregular 
migration in May 2006. When questioned by a parliamentary committee about the 
number of irregular migrants in the UK, the Head of Removals within BIA's 
predecessor, the Immigration and Nationalities Directorate (IND), David Roberts, 
admitted that IND “didn’t have the faintest idea”. The admission was instantly picked 
up on by the mass media, and the HO was lambasted for its incompetence. But as one 
former HO official related, 
Most people in IND said, good on you Dave, you told it as it is, of course we haven’t 
the faintest idea, why are they asking this question? Don’t they know, we only know 
what we know. We know what we control. By definition, we don’t know who we 
don’t control (Interview, May 2007) 
The anecdote suggests how very far off the IND is from a Foucauldian style agency, 
intent on maximizing intelligence to enhance its control. Instead, the organization is 
quite pragmatic about the problems of control, and would rather this particular stone 
was left unturned. It considers organizational legitimacy would be better served 
through keeping such issues vague, or “foggy” (Bommes and Sciortino 2008), rather 
than gathering more knowledge (contrast Bigo’s account of security agencies – Bigo 
2005). 
 
Turning now to the organizational context of migration control, again, there are strong 
factors militating against a “rationalist”, output oriented use of social knowledge. 
Neo-instutionalist organization theory provides excellent insight into how this type of 
fogginess may be the best way of managing conflict and uncertainty within 
organizations. On these accounts, organisations are not oriented exclusively towards 
supposedly “rational” goals, such as realising their mandates or expanding their 
power. Instead, they are preoccupied with a number of socio-psychological tasks: 
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stabilising social relations through establishing organizational routines, rituals and 
roles, and reducing uncertainty through developing a shared cognitive map, or 
organizational narrative, of the organisation and its environment. These various 
practices and beliefs frequently diverge form what might be understood as efficient 
structures and procedures. But they are crucial to organizational reproduction, in 
terms of motivating members and providing conditions for decision-making in 
conditions of extreme complexity. 
 
For organizations faced with acute conflicts and patently unrealisable goals, such as 
the Home Office, the most effective organizational narrative may involve a substantial 
degree of “fogginess”. The organization is quite conscious of the conflict between 
public expectations and professed organizational targets, on the one hand, and what it 
is able to deliver on the other. In order to cope with this discrepancy, it is useful to 
develop a self-perception of being a largely reactive organization, hit by successive 
crises (Boswell 2007). As David Blunkett described his experiences in running the 
HO: 
The Home Office was reactive, an absorber of punishment. All home secretaries 
whom I have ever seen interviewed talked about things coming out of the blue sky 
and hitting them (cited in Pollard 2005: 258). 
 
The implication is that an organization such as the HO may prefer to disguise the 
limitations of its control capacity through symbolic regulation and only half-hearted 
enforcement. Of course, this is another way of conceptualising the famous “gap 
hypothesis” (Cornelius et al. 1992). But I would suggest that it is one that provides a 
richer understanding of this discrepancy: this is not simply a conflict of interests 
(politics versus the economy, or states versus markets) that the state has “decided” to 
resolve in favour of the economy. Rather, it reflects a crisis of societal steering, which 
the state attempts to obscure through symbolic policies and patterns of knowledge 
utilization oriented towards political and internal priorities, rather than more effective 
steering.  
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3. Implications for Narratives of Migration Control 
 
As I hope to have shown, the problems of societal steering in the area of migration 
control are immense. Such interventions are targeted at highly complex and self-
referential systems. Moreover, these systems operate according to principles of 
inclusion that tend to incorporate illegal immigrants, creating ample opportunity for 
irregular migrants to access those systems that are most crucial for their welfare. State 
attempts to regulate these processes tend to draw on simplified narratives of the causal 
processes within the targeted systems. 
 
Under these conditions, what stories are states likely to tell themselves and their 
publics about migration control? Their narratives of societal steering are unlikely to 
be tailored exclusively, or even predominantly, towards producing optimal outcomes 
in terms of migration control. Rather, they are likely to be developed with two other 
ends in mind: satisfying societal expectations about the state’s willingness and 
capacity to control migration; and satisfying internal organizational requirements. 
Indeed, it may be useful to think about three main drivers of such narratives of 
migration control: 
 
1- Output-driven narratives, which attempt to model social dynamics in the most 
accurate way possible, in order to maximise the chance of successful 
interventions. Such narratives are likely, where possible, to draw on expert 
knowledge on the dynamics of illegal migration and social systems. 
2- Political narratives, which are designed to meet societal/politically mobilised 
expectations about appropriate action in relation to migration control. Such 
narratives seek to meet political targets through more symbolic means, often 
obscuring the discrepancy between professed goals and state capacity. 
3- Organizational narratives, which seek to mobilise support and underpin the 
decision-making capacity of members of organizations involved in policy-
making. These narratives involve rationalizing and making sense of 
organizational conflicts or short-comings in delivering professed targets. 
 
Each of the three types of driver is likely to produce different types of narratives. 
Output-driven narratives are likely to be more technocratic, setting store by the 
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validity of knowledge being produced – whether this is validated through drawing on 
the experience or expertise of practitioners, or more traditional forms of scientific 
research. Political narratives will tend to be more colourful and dramatised, increasing 
their chances of being covered by the mass media and thus resonating with the public. 
They will often be polarised along government/opposition lines, pointing to the failure 
or success of the incumbent’s approach. Finally, organisational narratives will need to 
be simple enough to be marshalled and communicated by officials, and also 
compelling enough to mobilise support from the policy community and those 
involved in implementation.  
 
All three types of narratives may, in their different ways, “short-circuit” the 
complexity of the social systems they are seeking to regulate. In particular, political 
narratives may well adopt highly simplistic, dramatised accounts of migration and the 
impact of policy on these dynamics, often favouring restrictive and punitive 
approaches. But they are also the sorts of narrative most likely to prevail in highly 
political areas of regulation attempting to steer complex systems, such as that of 
migration control. 
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